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This thesis evaluates the acquisition strategies of 
two developmental weapon system programs: Army Tactical 
Missile System (ATACMS) and Javelin Medium Antiarmor 
Weapon System. The study examines the defense acquisi- 
tion process through the comparison of the acquisition 
strategies of the programs. An analysis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the two acquisition strategies and an 
evaluation of the similarities and differences of the two 
programs are provided. From this study, lessons learned 
are identified that can be used by other acquisition 
managers and their staffs to effectively manage future 
programs. Significant lessons learned indicate that the 
maturity level of technology selected for use, proper 
tailoring, use of realism and dual sourcing are critical 
to the successful development of an acquisition strategy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Program managers are required by the Department of 
Defense (DoD) to develop a comprehensive framework for 
planning and managing acquisition programs. The acquisition 
strategy for a program serves this purpose. The acquisition 
strategy is developed at the onset of a new program to provide 
an organized and consistent approach to meeting established 
program objectives. Successful program management requires 
the continuing actions of planning, organizing, directing, 
coordinating, controlling and evaluating the use of resources 
such as money, facilities and materials to meet the 
established program objectives within the given constraints. 
Therefore the acquisition strategy, which establishes the plan 
for meeting the program objectives, becomes very important. 
One factor in the successful management of an acquisition 
program is the application of lessons learned from previous 
programs. The study of previous programs is one method that 
can be used to discover lessons learned. Army Tactical 
Missile System (ATACMS) and Javelin Medium Antiarmor Weapon 
System are two acquisition programs that are far enough along 
in the acquisition process to serve as cases to be studied 
with the purpose of examining the development and execution of 
an acquisition strategy for the acquisition of a major 
developmental weapon system. 
B. AREA OF RESEARCH 
The area of research for this thesis is the acquisition 
strategies for the ATACMS and the Javelin. The thesis 
addresses the acquisition strategies used for both programs 
and makes a comparative analysis. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the similarities and differences in the 
acquisition strategies used for ATACMS and Javelin and what 
can Program Managers learn from the success or failure of the 
execution of these programs' acquisition strategies? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What were the acquisition strategies used by- 
each of the programs and were the strategies selected 
appropriate for these programs? 
b. To what extent did the programs follow the 
acquisition strategies established at the start of the 
programs? 
c. What were the strengths and weaknesses of each 
of the two acquisition strategies? 
d. What impact does the acquisition strategy of a 
program have on the program's success or failure? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis is a case study of the acquisition strategies 
used for the ATACMS and Javelin. This thesis includes general 
descriptions of the systems being compared for only as much 
technical specificity as is necessary to compare the 
acquisition strategies. The study is a comparative analysis 
of the acquisition strategies used for each program. The 
study investigates the successes and shortcomings of the 
acquisition strategies used for each program. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The information used in this thesis was obtained from 
two separate data collection efforts. First, a comprehensive 
literature review was conducted. Second, interviews with 
appropriate personnel provided insight into the programs used 
in the study. The literature review included the examination 
of articles, journals, periodicals and system documentation 
provided by the program offices. The interviews were 
conducted with professors and other subject matter experts. 
F. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study serves as a basis for future research and 
discussion on developing and evaluating acquisition strategies 
for major developmental weapon systems. 
G. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized in the following manner: 
Chapter I provides general comments, area of study, 
research questions, scope, methodology, benefits of study and 
organization of the study. 
Chapter II presents background information on the concept 
of an acquisition strategy. The chapter covers the evolution 
of the concept of acquisition strategy, how the acquisition 
strategy fits into the overall acquisition process, DoD 
guidance on development, benefits, alternative approaches and 
measurement criteria of acquisition strategies. 
Chapter III provides a brief history of ATACMS and 
Javelin. It also outlines the characteristics of each weapon 
system and discusses the acquisition strategies used by each 
program. 
Chapter IV is a comparative analysis of the two 
acquisition strategies. The focus of this chapter is the 
successes and failures of the acquisition strategies used by 
each program. This chapter also compares each program's 
acquisition strategy to the evaluation criteria established in 
Chapter II.and outlines the principal lessons learned from the 
study. 
Chapter V draws conclusions from the analysis, makes 
recommendations and answers the research questions. 

II. ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Development of an acquisition strategy is one of the 
first tasks that must be completed by a program manager at the 
onset of a new acquisition program. The acquisition strategy 
is a very important document in the acquisition process 
because it lays the foundation for management concepts, 
control measures, contracting alternatives, test and 
evaluation requirements, logistics support, manning and 
training.requirements, funding issues and many other factors 
for the program. The program manager is forced to make key 
decisions very early in the program. The acquisition strategy 
is a means by which the program manager can evaluate and 
integrate these decisions so that as few options as possible 
are eliminated early in the program cycle. This chapter 
examines the concept of "acquisition strategy" and how the 
acquisition strategy fits into the overall acquisition 
process. The chapter also outlines various approaches that 
may be used in the development of an acquisition strategy and 
outline some criteria that may be used to evaluate the 
potential effectiveness of an acquisition strategy. 
B. EVOLUTION OP ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The concept of acquisition strategy has been studied and 
reviewed since the 1950s. The concept of acquisition strategy 
began to gain prominence in the 1970s based on reports by the 
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, the Commission on Government 
Procurement and the publishing of Department of Defense 
Instruction 5000.1. These reports focused on the need for 
better procurement planning in the acquisition of major weapon 
systems. Office of Management and Budget (0MB) Circular A- 
109, published in 1976, further reinforced the need for 
improved acquisition planning. [Ref. 4:p. 26] 
Numerous studies have been completed over the years which 
have attempted to define or to improve upon the development 
and implementation of acquisition strategies. The term 
"acquisition strategy" was initially used to describe the 
overall planning process of a program. One conclusion from an 
early study was that a program's acquisition strategy was the 
mechanism which coordinated the widely dispersed activities in 
the acquisition process [Ref. 6:p. 129]. These past studies 
are useful and their result has been increased awareness of 
the importance of planning as a management tool in the 
acquisition process. [Ref. 4:pp. 26-27] 
C. ACQUISITION STRATEGY DEFINITION 
The term acquisition strategy is defined in the "Program 
Manager's Notebook" published by the Defense Systems 
Management College as follows: 
A combination of business and technical management 
concepts designed to achieve program objectives 
within imposed resource constraints. It is the 
framework for managing research, development, test, 
production, fielding, support and other essential 
program activates. It is the basis for formulating 
functional plans; e.g., the Acquisition Plan, Test 
and Evaluation Master Plan, and Integrated 
Logistics Support Plan.  [Ref. 3:p. 1.5.2] 
D. ACQUISITION STRATEGY AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
Policy and Guidance for the acquisition of major systems 
within the Federal Government was published in OMB Circular A- 
109 in 1976. The primary purpose of the policies outlined in 
the circular are "to assure the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the process of acquiring major systems." [Ref. 7:p. 47] 
Seven management objectives were outlined by OMB in Circular 
A-109 to be used by Federal Agencies in achieving the goal of 
assuring effectiveness and efficiency in acquisitions of major 
systems. Two of these objectives specifically address the 
concept of acquisition strategy.  They are: 
1. Accomplish system acquisition planning, built 
on analysis of agency missions, which implies 
appropriate resource allocation resulting from 
clear articulation of agency mission needs. 
2. Tailor an acquisition strategy for each 
program, as soon as the agency decides to solicit 
alternative system design concepts, that could lead 
to the acquisition of a new major system and refine 
the strategy as the program proceeds through the 
acquisition process. Encompass test and evaluation 
criteria and business management considerations in 
the strategy. The strategy could typically 
include: o use of the contracting process as an 
important tool in the acquisition program o 
Scheduling of essential elements of the acquisition 
process o Demonstration, test, and evaluation 
criteria o Content of solicitations and proposals o 
Decisions on whom to solicit o Methods for 
obtaining and sustaining competition o Guidelines 
for the evaluation and acceptance or rejection of 
proposals o Goals for design-to-cost o Methods for 
projecting life cycle costs o Use of data rights o 
Use of warranties o Methods for analyzing and 
evaluating contractor and Government risks o Need 
for developing contractor incentives o Selection of 
the type of contract best suited for each stage in 
the acquisition process o Administration of 
contracts. [Ref. 7:p. 48-49] 
The Department of Defense has published Department of 
Defense Directive (DoDD) 5000.1, "Defense Acquisition" and 
Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2 "Defense 
Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures" as its 
implementation guidance for the acquisition of major systems. 
The policies and directives established in DoDD 5000.1 and 
DoDI 5000.2 are based on the objectives outlined in 0MB 
Circular A-109. These documents provide DoD with policies and 
procedures for managing acquisition programs within DoD. 
The major system acquisition process outlined in DoDI 
5000.2 begins with the determination of a mission need and 
then flows through five distinct phases. Before the start of 
each phase a review is conducted, to validate the need for the 
system and to review the programs progress to that point. The 
review concludes with a decision to continue the program as 
planned, modify it or terminate it.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
acquisition process as defined in DoDI 5000.2.  [Ref. 2:p. 3- 
4] 
The program manager is required by DoD policy to develop 
a comprehensive acquisition strategy covering the entire life 
cycle of the program. The program manager has the 
responsibility to tailor the acquisition phases and milestones 
outlined in DoDI 5000.2 to fit the unique requirements and 
conditions of the program. [Ref 3:p. 1.5-2] Acquisition 
strategies are normally developed during Phase 0, Concept 
Exploration and Definition. Once developed the acquisition 
strategy is initially approved at Milestone I, Concept 
Demonstration Approval, and becomes Annex C of the Integrated 
Program Summary (IPS) . The IPS is intended to provide the 
milestone decision authority a succinct, integrated picture of 
the program status so that decisions on the program can be 
made. The IPS is reviewed and updated at each subsequent 
milestone review. The acquisition strategy as a part of the 
IPS is also reviewed and updated at each milestone review. 
[Ref. 2:p. 2-8] 
E.   GUIDANCE ON DEVELOPMENT 
Guidelines for the development of an acquisition strategy 
are outlined in DoDI 5000.2. The acquisition strategy should 
link milestone decision reviews to events and accomplishments 
in development, testing and production. The strategy must 
reflect the relationships and scheduling of the acquisition 
phases and events. The primary goal in the development of an 
acquisition strategy should be to minimize the time required 
to satisfy the identified need consistent with common sense 
and sound business practices. The acquisition strategy should 
be an evolving document that becomes increasingly more 
definitive as the program progresses. Essential elements that 
should be discussed in the acquisition strategy are 
management, technical, resources, testing, training, 
deployment, support and any other aspects critical to a 
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Figure 1.  Acquisition Milestones & Phases 
program's success. Event-based acquisition strategies, 
triggered by task performance, should be used as opposed to 
passage-of-time-based strategies. The acquisition strategy- 
should be tailored to meet the specific needs of individual 
programs. The strategy should be developed in enough detail 
to establish a managerial approach that can be used to direct 
and control all aspects of the program. Clear descriptions of 
the performance, cost and schedule risk elements and the 
strategies to mitigate these anticipated risks should be 
included. The acquisition strategy must be kept current and 
updated as changes occur. [Ref. 2:pp. 5-A-1-5-A-2] Key points 
of an acquisition strategy are summarized in Table 1. 
Purpose Provides conceptual basis of 
overall plan that follows in 
program execution 
Emphasis Comprehensive overview of 
entire program 
Format Tailored to each program and 
included in integrated program 
summary as Acquisition 
Strategy Report 
Prepared by Program Manager 
When Prepared During Concept Exploration and 
Definition Phase 
When Approved Early in acquisition process 
on or about Milestone I and 
revalidated at each milestone 
Authority Accountability 
Channels 
Program Executive Officer - 
Service Acquisition Executive 
Policy/Procedures OMB A-109, DoDD 5000.1, DoDI 
5000.2 
Table 1.  Acquisition Strategy Summary 
[Ref. 5:p. 1.5-3] 
F.   BENEFITS OF ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
Successful program management requires the simultaneous 
coordination of planning, organizing, directing, controlling, 
evaluating and many other actions. A sound acquisition 
strategy can help the program manager to accomplish these 
10 
tasks. The program manager can benefit from his efforts in 
the development of a sound, sensible and comprehensive 
acquisition strategy. [Ref. 5:p. 3-1] Some benefits that 
can be realized are listed below. 
1. Provide an Organized and Consistent Approach 
The acquisition strategy can be seen as a master 
checklist used to ensure important issues and alternatives are 
considered. Development of the strategy forces the program 
manager to look past the near term to the end of the program, 
thus providing the framework for a consistent approach in the 
execution of the program. Inadequate planning at the 
initiation of a program and throughout the program as well can 
lead to increased diversions from the program objectives, 
increasing the likelihood of future cost, schedule and 
performance problems as the program progresses. [Ref. 5:p. 3- 
2] 
2. Permit Informed and Timely Decisions 
One primary purpose of the acquisition strategy is to 
establish priorities and integrate the functional 
requirements. Examples of functional requirements that must 
be dealt with are: evaluate and select important issue 
alternatives, identify opportunities and times for critical 
decisions and provide a coordinated approach to achieving 
program objectives economically and effectively. The 
acquisition strategy can been seen as the road map for program 
planning and execution. Information gained as the program 
progresses should be used to adjust the acquisition strategy 
as necessary.  [Ref. 5:p. 3-2] 
3. Achieve Agreement on the Program 
The acquisition strategy becomes the baseline for 
preparing the plans and activities to be accomplished by the 
program. The acquisition strategy can be seen as a contract 
between the program manager and the major players, milestone 
decision authority, user, developer, supporter and tester, 
with the intent of obliging the parties to achieve the 
11 
objectives and goals of the program. The acquisition strategy- 
should serve as the basis for all functional planning.  [Ref. 
5:p. 3-2] 
4. Provide Communication About the Program 
The acquisition strategy documents the reasoning and 
assumptions on which the program is based. It serves as a 
program guide and documents the progress achieved as the 
program progresses, thus providing an audit trail for 
succeeding program managers. It can also serve as a standard 
by which the progress of the program can be measured. [Ref. 
5:p. 3-2] 
5. Build Advocacy and Support 
In today's times of ever-shrinking budgets, the 
importance of DoD and Congressional approval in the life cycle 
of a program has become very important. The acquisition 
strategy should be a credible and realistic approach to the 
accomplishment of the program objectives. Once approved, the 
acquisition strategy can become the main advocate for the 
program from DoD through Congress and the White House. The 
acquisition strategy can become the vehicle on which a 
consensus is formed that the developed approach is the best 
available for the development of the new system. [Ref. 5:p. 
3-2] 
G.   ACQUISITION STRATEGY STRUCTURE 
In developing an acquisition strategy it is necessary to 
identify those elements that are critical to the program and 
select alternatives and decision points that will enable the 
program objectives to be met. The program manager, in 
developing an acquisition strategy, must be able to recognize 
the key areas of concern and know which options are available 
to address these areas. Three concerns that should be 
considered are strategic, technical and resource. Strategic 
concerns include such areas as National objectives, nature of 
the threat, overall program objectives and market factors. 
Technical concerns that should be considered are design, test 
12 
and evaluation, production and deployment. The program 
manager must also consider resources available for use of the 
program. Resource considerations include personnel and 
organization, schedule, business and financial, management 
information and facilities. [Ref. 5:pp. 3-2-3-4] 
H.   ALTERNATIVES AND APPROACHES 
There are numerous tools and techniques available to the 
program manager in the development of an acquisition strategy. 
The selection of specific alternatives and approaches for use 
in the development of the program become the basic elements 
of the acquisition strategy. [Ref. 5:p. 5-1] These 
alternatives and approaches are integrated into the 
acquisition strategy and can be used to measure the success or 
failure of the program.  [Ref. 9:p. 43] 
1.   Competition 
Competition can take many forms. There may be no 
competition at all, with justification, or competition may 
involve two or more competitors. Competition can take place 
at any stage during the acquisition process. For example 
during the developmental phase of the program, two or more 
competitors may be asked to develop conceptual designs or 
approaches to meet the required mission need. Competition can 
also be carried further into the program through the 
Demonstration and Validation Phase, Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development Phase and finally through the 
Production and Deployment Phase of the program. [Ref. 5:p. 5- 
3] The Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 34, Major System 
Acquisition specifies that: 
The Program Manager shall, throughout the 
acquisition process, promote and sustain 
competition between alternative major system 
concepts, as long as it is economically beneficial 
and practical to do so. 
The requirement for competition is reinforced in DoD policy. 
13 
DoDI 5000.2 requires the program manager to describe plans for 
the development of a competitive environment in all phases of 
the acquisition strategy. 
Advantages of competition: 
• Obtaining a lower price 
• Obtaining higher quality 
• Expanding the industrial base 
• Providing more than one source for product 
innovation 
• Encouraging an incumbent to be more cost conscious 
and receptive to the buyers' concerns [Ref. 5:p. 
5-3] 
Disadvantages of competition: 
• Increased management of configuration control 
• Quality variances 
• Time and cost of bringing the second source on line 
[Ref. 5:p. 5-3] 
2.   Concurrency 
Concurrency is the elimination, combination or overlap of 
one or more phases or procedures in the acquisition process. 
The objective of concurrency is to shorten the overall 
acquisition process. The shortening, however, does not come 
without cost. The use of concurrency often increases program 
risk due to the acceleration of the process. Concurrency is 
used most to expedite development and production so the weapon 
system can be fielded more quickly. Concurrency can also be 
used to offset delays caused by cost, funding, technical or 
other problems. The technology used in the program is one of 
the key considerations in deciding the amount of concurrency, 
if any, is to be used. The more complex or novel the 
technology the higher the risk of using concurrency becomes. 
[Ref. ll:pp. 24-25] 
Advantages of concurrency: 
• Achievement of earlier operational capability 
• Reduced cost 
14 
• Design maturity or start-up problems can be 
identified at an early stage in the program [Ref. 
5:p. 5-16] 
Disadvantages of concurrency: 
• Increased risk of schedule shortfall and cost 
overrun  [Ref. 5:p. 5-16] 
• Key decisions must be made early before critical 
information about the system's operational 
effectiveness, reliability, logistic supportability 
and readiness for production is known  [Ref. 11:p. 
• 25] 
3.   Preplanned Product Improvement (P3I) 
Preplanned Product Improvement is an acquisition strategy 
where, during the system's concept phase, cost effective 
upgrading of the system is planned throughout  the system's 
life cycle to enhance readiness, performance or availability. 
[Ref. 5:p. 5-46]  P3I defers technologically difficult system 
requirements in favor of getting the system in the hands of 
the user faster.  The deferred requirements are continued to 
be developed and added to the system at a later date.  Items 
that an effective P3I strategy include are: the use of modular 
designs, a carefully designed architectural interface system 
and provisions for the anticipated growth of the system. The 
P3I strategy should include plans for communicating system 
growth  requirements  and  for  identifying  technological 
opportunities.  P3I provides flexibility to add advancements 
to a baseline system without disrupting the present design. 
[Ref. 3:p. 4.2-2] 
Advantages of P3I: 
• Responsiveness to threat changes and further 
technological advances 
• Earlier initial operational capability with a 
baseline, system 
• Reduces development risks 
• Increased effective operational life  [Ref. 5:p. 5- 
15 
47] 
Disadvantages of P3I: 
• Increased nonrecurring cost during development 
• Increased technical requirements in areas such as 
weight, size or power 
• Increased complexity in configuration management 
• Vulnerability to  "gold plating"  criticism and 
funding cuts  [Ref. 5:p. 5-47] 
4.   Standardization 
Standardization as defined by the Defense System 
Management College' s "Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms 
and Terms"   is 
The process by which DoD achieves the closest 
practical cooperation among forces; the most 
efficient use of research, development, and 
production resources; and agree to adopt on the 
broadest possible basis the use of (a) common or 
compatible operational, administrative, and 
logistics procedures and criteria; (b) common or 
compatible technical procedures and criteria; (c) 
common or compatible, or interchangeable supplies, 
components, weapons, or equipment; and (d) common 
or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding 
organizational compatibility.  [Ref. 10:p. B-104] 
Budgetary constraints placed on the Services have forced 
the Service's leadership to seek less costly ways of meeting 
mission requirements. One such way is to purchase components 
or equipment that are common within other Services or 
countries. The use of standardization must be carefully 
considered because it is the view of many that the use of 
standards is constraining to contractors and adds extra 
unnecessary cost. Others are of the opinion that standards 
represent the accumulated experience gained from other 
acquisition efforts and provide many useful lessons across any 
program.   [Ref. 5:pp. 5-54-5-55] 
Advantages of standardization: 
• Reduction of unnecessary proliferation with the 
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result of a saving of manpower and money 
• Risk reduction in that standard parts usually have 
proven performance and reliability records 
• No qualification of new items is required resulting 
in a time saving 
Disadvantages of standardization: 
• Reduces contractor innovation 
• Has the potential to limit competition 
• Can be overly stringent resulting in excess cost 
5.   Acquisition Streamlining 
Acquisition streamlining is an effort to shorten the 
acquisition process by the use of functional specifications in 
place of detailed Military Specifications or by the 
elimination of unnecessary requirements. [Ref. 2:p. 15-2] 
Streamlining is not only concerned with shortening the 
acquisition process it also has the goal of improving quality. 
DoDI 5000.2 provides several methods to accomplish 
streamlining.  These include: 
1. State requirements in terms of performance 
rather than design. 
2. Use non-developmental items whenever possible. 
3. Involve industry early in the acquisition 
effort to take advantage of industry expertise to 
improve the acquisition strategy. 
4. Eliminate all non-essential data requirements. 
5. Do not apply design solutions, specifications 
and standards prematurely.  [Ref. 2:p. 10-C-l] 
Advantages of streamlining: 
• Achievement of earlier operational capability 
• Reduced cost 
• Provides the contractor with more flexibility 
[Ref. 5:p. 5-55] 
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Disadvantages of streamlining: 
• Increased complexity in configuration management 
• Quality variances 
• Increased performance risk  [Ref. 5:p. 5-55] 
I.   CRITERIA 
The acquisition strategy is critical in the life cycle of 
an acquisition program. There are certain aspects of an 
acquisition strategy that have proven to be beneficial in 
ensuring the acquisition strategy is able to meet the program 
objectives. Some aspects of successful acquisition strategies 
are discussed below. 
1. Realism 
Realism can be viewed as the reasonableness of the 
acquisition strategy.. A realistic acquisition strategy must 
be based on realistic program objectives. If the program 
objectives are impossible to attain, then it will be 
impossible to develop an acquisition strategy that is 
realistic to achieve the unreachable goals. Realism is 
important in that only a realistic approach will gain support 
for the program at higher levels. One approach is to try to 
maintain the middle ground between being overly optimistic and 
overly conservative.  [Ref. 5:pp. 3-9-3-12] 
2. Stability. 
Stability is a characteristic that keeps internal or 
external influences from seriously disrupting the processes of 
the program. It would be naive to think that a program will 
not experience change during its life cycle but a well 
designed acquisition strategy can help build stability. The 
funding process and requirement changes are forces that work 
against stability. Direction, advocacy and commitment can 
help a program manger to achieve stability. A stable program 
has an acquisition strategy that clearly delineates program 
objectives, approaches and control procedures. Programs that 
show lack of control or purpose are likely targets for cuts. 
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Strong support from high-level positions also helps to build 
stability, therefore it is important to know who the key- 
supporters are and to cultivate new ones whenever possible. 
Programs that can establish commitments that are not easily- 
broken also gain stability. These commitments could be 
agreements with foreign governments or multi-year contracts. 
[Ref. 5:pp. 3-3-13-3-14] 
3. Balance 
Balance in an acquisition strategy is a condition of 
equilibrium between program objectives. Almost all programs 
must work under constraints, therefore the limited resources 
must be split between program objectives to best achieve the 
overall goals of the program. Balance can also be viewed in 
terms of risk. In this case a balanced program is one in 
which all risks are approximately equal. Balance is an 
important aspect of an acquisition strategy because over 
emphasizing one objective could cause the program to fail to 
meet other objectives. Fully understanding the priorities, 
risk, resource requirements and relationships for each 
objective will help the program manager to develop a balanced 
strategy. Clear understanding of mission requirements and 
alternative approaches is also key to the successful 
development of an acquisition strategy that is balanced. Some 
ways to achieve balance are priority analysis, resource 
allocation and cost/risk sharing.  [Ref. 5:pp. 3-14-3-17] 
4. Flexibility 
Flexibility is an acquisition strategy's ability to 
successfully adapt to changes that occur. The completion of 
"what if" analysis can prove to be very useful in achieving 
flexibility. Change is inevitable so it is important to have 
a strategy that deals with change and minimizes its impact. 
One key to developing a flexible acquisition strategy is to 
have the ability to predict areas with a high probability of 
change. Every possible contingency cannot be planned for so 
it is important to focus on significant areas. Dual sourcing, 
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P3I and management reserves are some ways that can be used to 
achieve flexibility.  [Ref. 5:p. 3-17] 
5.   Controlled Risk 
.Risk in an acquisition strategy is a measure of the 
probability and consequence of not achieving a defined program 
objective. OMB Circular A-109, DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2 
specifically state that risk must be addressed, but it is not 
always easy to assess risk. Risk assessment is the underlying 
analysis approach in the development of an acquisition 
strategy. It can become the basis of determining conformance 
to the other criteria mentioned: realism, stability, balance 
and flexibility. The other criteria can be viewed as the 
elements necessary to minimize program risk throughout the 
acquisition strategy. [Ref. 5:p. 3-20] 
J.   SUMMARY 
The development of an effective acquisition strategy at 
the initiation of a program can yield tremendous benefits 
throughout the life cycle of the program. Therefore, 
understanding the elements that should be considered and 
having knowledge of methods that have succeeded in the past in 
the development of an acquisition strategy is very important. 
This chapter has made an effort to enhance overall 
understanding of an acquisition strategy. This chapter has 
defined the term "acquisition strategy", outlined how an 
acquisition strategy fits into the acquisition process, 
outlined guidance provided by DoD on the development, listed 
some benefits derived from the development, outlined 
alternative approaches and listed some evaluation criteria for 
use in the development of an acquisition strategy. 
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III.  SYSTEM OVERVIEWS: ATACMS AND JAVELIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Army Tactical Missile System and Javelin are both 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) ID programs that fall under the 
control of the Program Executive Officer (PEO) Tactical 
Missiles located at Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville Alabama. 
This chapter provides a brief overview of each of the weapon 
systems. The chapter also examines the acquisition strategies 
employed in the initiation of ATACMS and Javelin and how the 
program managers executed the strategies as the programs 
progressed. 
B. ARMY TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEM (ATACMS) 
1. Background 
The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is a ground 
launched, inertial guided missile system consisting of a 
surface-to-surface ballistic missile designed to be used in 
the deep attack of enemy forces at ranges beyond the 
capability of existing rockets. The missile was designed for 
two basic configurations. The first being antipersonnel and 
the second being anti-material. ATACMS missiles are fired 
from a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) modified M270 
launcher. The anti-personnel configuration, Block I design, 
is loaded with M74 bomblets which are effective against 
personnel and light skinned equipment. The Block I missile 
warhead dispenses the bomblets over the designated target. 
The antimaterial, Block II design, contains multiple anti- 
material submunitions which are dispensed over the designated 
target. The prime contractor for the production of ATACMS is 
the Loral Vought Systems (LVS) located in Dallas, Texas. 
[Ref. 19:p. 12] 
2. Mission 
The mission of ATACMS is to provide the Corps Commander 
with the capability to interdict and destroy second-echelon 
enemy forces. The missile is designed to operate in near all- 
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weather conditions and is intended to be used on high-priority- 
targets such as tactical surface-to-surface missile sites, air 
defense systems, logistics elements and command/control/ 
communication sites.  [Ref. 15:p. 145] 
3.  Technical Description 
The major components of ATACMS can be broken down into 
the following areas: guidance and control, warhead, propulsion 
and launcher. Figure 2 is an illustration of the Block I 
ATACMS missile configuration. 
a. Guidance and Control 
There are two major electronic subsystems that 
provide guidance and control for ATACMS. Guidance is provided 
by the H700-3A Ring Laser Gyro Missile Guidance Set. The 
guidance set provides the navigation, guidance, weapons 
dispensing, autopilot and communications for the missile while 
in flight and for ground operations. This guidance system's 
operability was proven during the Assault Breaker 
Demonstration. [Ref. 13:p. 23] The ring laser gyro 
technology is also in use in commercial applications such as 
aircraft navigational equipment. The control actuation system 
(CAS) provides control of the missile. The CAS consists of 
small motors which turn the fins, located on the rear of the 
missile body, to control the flight of the missile. [Ref. 
28:p. 543] 
b. Warhead 
Several warheads were planned for ATACMS. The Block 
I missile consists of 1000 M74 antipersonnel/materiel (APAM) 
bomblets. The payload is dispersed by a central exploder, 
which blows off the nosecone skin, distributing the bomblets 
over the target. These APAM bomblets were developed and used 
in a previously developed weapon system, Lance. The planned 
Block II missile caries smart submunitions that take advantage 
of infrared technology. The infrared technology allows the 
submunitions to lock-on and attack individual targets. Block 
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Figure 2.  Block I Missile Configuration 
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c-  Propulsion 
The propulsion system used on the ATACMS is a solid 
rocket motor using Arcademe 360 propellants. This same type 
of motor is also used for the MLRS rocket and made by the same 
manufacturer that makes the MLRS rocket, Atlantic Research. 
The propellent, ignitor and motor cases are of standard 
composition and construction. [Ref. 12 :p. 1] 
d.   Launcher 
The ATACMS launcher is a modified M270 MLRS 
launcher. The missile was integrated into the existing 
launch pod container and adapted to the M270 launcher. The 
Program Manager in 1986, Colonel Thomas Kunhart, saw the 
integration as the most difficult task facing the Program 
Office at the time.  [Ref. 26:p. 69] 
4.   Technical History 
The genesis of ATACMS can be traced to the culmination of 
a series of efforts to improve the overall range, accuracy and 
effectiveness of mid-range missile systems. Based on changes 
to Army doctrine derived from the move to the Air-Land-Battle 
concept, the need for a weapon system that allows the Corps 
Commander to attack targets within his area of influence was 
required. The following is a summation of the events/programs 
that ATACMS's acquisition strategy was based on.  [Ref. 13 :p. 
1] 
The "Assault Breaker" technology demonstration program 
begun in 1978 by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) proved that the technology existed to attack enemy 
second-echelon forces beyond the capability of the existing 
cannons and rockets. The Army established a special task 
force in 1981 to continue the technology demonstration begun 
under "Assault Breaker". The Special Task Force's mission was 
to develop the requirements for a Corps Support Weapons System 
(CSWS) to engage high priority targets beyond the range of 
existing weapons. The Air Force was working on the 
development of a similar weapon system at the same time.  The 
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Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 
(USDRE) directed the formulation of a joint program in 1983 
which combined the Army's and the Air Force's programs into 
one program called the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS). 
The Air Force ended its participation in the program in 1984. 
The Army requested and received DoD Approval to continue the 
program. The Army completed and received approval of the 
Required Operational Capability (ROC), now the Operational 
Requirement Document (ORD), in May 19 85 and the program was 
renamed the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) . [Ref. 
13:p. 1-2] 
5.   Acquisition Strategy 
Based on the studies conducted prior to program 
initiation, "Assault Breaker" and technical maturity 
assessments, the ATACMS acquisition strategy called for the 
elimination of Phase 0, Concept Exploration and Definition, 
and Phase I, Demonstration and Validation. The elimination of 
the acquisition phases was made possible due to the maturity 
level technology selected for use on ATACMS. The technologies 
were developed and proven during the past studies. ATACMS was 
to begin with a 48-month Phase II, Full-Scale Development 
(FSD), now Engineering and Manufacturing Development. The 
plan called for the award of a development contract with two 
low-rate initial production (LRIP) options. The second LRIP 
option was to be used if problems were encountered during the 
initial testing of the missile and delays to the program 
schedule. The completion of LRIP was to be followed by full- 
rate production (FRP). The use of P3I was planned to reduce 
development cost and to allow for improvement of the weapon 
system's warhead. The missile was to be designed so that it 
could accommodate additional warheads. ATACMS was also 
designated as a Defense Enterprise Program. This designation 
allowed the program office to streamline the acquisition 
process by eliminating all requirements except those required 
by statute. The plan was to use a multi-year procurement for 
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the production buy of the missiles. An alternate strategy of 
annual procurements was established in the event that Congress 
failed to approve the planned multi-year procurement. The 
strategy called for a first unit equipped (FUE) date of 
September 1990 and production runs until 1996. Figure 3 is an 
illustration of ATACMS schedule.  [Ref. 15:p. 1] 
Other aspects of ATACMS's acquisition strategy included 
solicitation and contract streamlining, early troop 
involvement with continuous test and evaluation, concurrency, 
hard-tooled prototypes and performance/quality guarantees. 
Solicitation and contract streamlining was an effort to 
specify requirements as generally as possible in all RFPs to 
leave the contractor with as much flexibility as possible. 
The plan was also to prevent "goldplating" by managing the ROC 
so that reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM) 
factors were not inflated past the proven technology. Early 
troop-in-the-loop involvement was planned beginning in the 
development test (DT). The early troop involvement was 
planned to allow the user to interact with the hardware early 
to minimize changes generated in the development process. 
Concurrency of production and testing was built into the 
program to reduce overall acquisition time. Hard-tooled 
prototypes required the contractor to establish and validate 
the production line early to help mitigate schedule and 
technical risk. Performance/quality guarantees were to be 
added through the inclusion of a warranty clause on all 
missiles to be bought. The warranty as planned was a three 
year warranty which required all missiles to meet performance, 
design and construction requirements and ro be free of 
defects.  [Ref. 13:pp. 60-61] 
The ATACMS acquisition strategy also included plans for 
the execution of FSD contracts. Two contracts were to be 
awarded during FSD. The first contract was for the 
development of Missile/Launch Pod Assembly (M/PLA or M39) and 
the second contract was for the integration of the M39 with 
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Figure 3. ATACMS Schedule 
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the MLRS launcher. The development contract would include 
production options and was to be a competitive award using a 
fixed-price-incentive-firm (FPIF) contract. The contract 
called for continuous low-rate production deliveries during 
FSD with a transition to FRP upon the completion of a 
successful LRIP and testing. Subcontractor competition was to 
be maximized through the prime contractor. The FSD 
integration contract was to be sole source to LTV, 
manufacturer of MLRS, with an FPIF contract. The full-rate 
production was to be competitively obtained by not-to-exceed 
(NTE) price options in the FSD development contract. The plan 
was to minimize the commitment to production before the 
testing was complete and to require the contractor to maintain 
a certified production line. The plan was also to explore 
dual source requirements for major missile system components. 
[Ref. 16] 
6.   Acquisition Strategy Execution 
The ATACMS acquisition strategy was briefed to and 
approved by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the Defense 
Review Board, the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council 
(ASARC) and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council in 
May 19 85. [Ref. 15:p. 1] The execution of the strategy 
began in June 1985 with the release of the FSD RFP and the FSD 
integration RFP, sole source to LTV. Competition for the 
development contract was restricted to the three contractors, 
Boeing Aerospace, Martin Marietta Aerospace and LTV, which had 
previously been awarded contracts for the JTACMS. Two 
proposals were received on 10 October 1985 for the development 
contract, one from LTV and the other from Boeing Aerospace 
Company. LTV was determined to be the winner of the 
competition. LTV was awarded two contracts in March, 1986 
one for the development and the other for the integration of 
the M39 as previously planned.  [Ref. 13:p. 8] 
The FSD development contract covered 48 months and 
required the contractor to provide design, development, 
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fabrication, and test support necessary to obtain the LRIP 
decision. The development contract included options for FSD 
engineering/test support, two LRIPs, and production. The 
production option covered all known production requirements on 
an NTE price basis, to be finalized with firm-fixed-price 
(FFP) contracts prior to exercising the option. An FPIF 
contract was used with cost as the only incentive. The target 
profit was 11% of the target cost and the ceiling price was 
125% of the target cost. A share ratio of 70% Government and 
30% contractor was used. Management reserve in the amount 
equal to the Government possible liability in the occurrence 
of a cost overrun was established.  [Ref. 13:pp. 8-9] 
The FSD integration contract was awarded sole source 
based on LTV's experience in the design, development and 
manufacturing of the MLRS. LTV was viewed as the only 
contractor with the ability to successfully complete the 
integration of the M39 and the MLRS. The contract awarded was 
an FPIF with cost as the only incentive. Target profit was 
established at 10% of target price and ceiling price was set 
at 125% of target price. The contract was funded to the 
ceiling price amount.  [Ref. 13:p. 13] 
Developmental testing was begun in April 1988 and the 
ASARC approval to exercise the LRIP I option was given on 5 
January 1989. [Ref. 19:p. 12] As LRIP I began Singer, 
provider of the CAS, went out of business. The result of 
losing Singer was a 6-month schedule slippage. The completion 
of developmental testing was delayed by six months due to this 
problem. Simmonds Precision was qualified as a new source for 
the CAS and a contract was awarded March 1988. In order to 
gain the required time to certify the new subcontractor, the 
program manager requested approval to exercise the LRIP II 
option. Approval to exercise the LRIP II option was granted 
on 20 December 1989. [Ref. 18:p. 43] Developmental testing 
was successfully completed in March 1990. The Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOTE) was conducted from 5 
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March 1990 to 8 June 1990 and was successfully completed. On 
2 November 1990 a Defense Acquisition Review Board (DAB) was 
held to make a Milestone III decision to enter into 
production. Approval was given to ATACMS to enter FRP under 
the FY 91 production option.  [Ref. 19:p. 12] 
The original schedule called for ATACMS to be deployed to 
U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) with an FUE of September 1990. The 
schedule was changed in support of Operation Desert Shield. 
The missiles scheduled to be sent to USAREUR were diverted to 
South West Asia (SWA). In order to meet the SWA requirement 
LRIP was accelerated twice. The SWA deployment was 
successfully completed in August 1990. Throughout the war, 
ATACMS was fired 32 times with no failures. [Ref. 18:pp. 36- 
37] 
The acceleration of LRIP caused a four month gap in 
production between LRIP II and FRP. The program manager 
requested and received supplemental funding to accelerate FRP- 
1 in March 1991 to preclude the gap in production. A 
solicitation for a multi-year contract for the production of 
ATACMS was issued to LTV in April 1991. The first FRP-1 
missiles were completed and delivered ahead of schedule. 
Deployments to Europe and Korea began in July 1991 and 
September 1991, respectively.    [Ref.  18:p. 36-37] 
The program is currently continuing production and 
deployment with all deployments being made on schedule. 
Possible improvements to ATACMS are all being worked by the 
program office. Potential improvements include extending the 
range, diversifying the sub-munitions and the installation of 
Global Positioning System. [Ref. 18:p. 37] 
C.   JAVELIN MEDIUM ANTIARMOR WEAPON SYSTEM 
1.   Background 
Javelin is a medium-range, man-portable, fire-and-forget 
antiarmor system for use in rapid deployment operations, rough 
terrain and air assault operations. Javelin is to replace the 
Army's current medium antiarmor weapon, Dragon.   Javelin 
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consists of two major components: a missile sealed in a 
disposable launch tube assembly and a reusable command launch 
unit (CLU). The missile is comprised of a seeker, guidance 
electronics, warhead and fuse, propulsion system and control 
actuator system. The missile is considered to be a "wooden 
round", that is, the missile requires no field level 
maintenance during its expected shelf life. The CLU may be 
used in the stand-alone mode for battlefield surveillance and 
target detection. Javelin has the capability of being fired 
in either top attack or direct fire mode. The system is 
capable of both day and night operation. Javelin features a 
soft launch capability that allows the weapon to be fired from 
enclosed areas such as a building or fighting position. Texas 
Instruments and Martin Marietta are the prime contractors for 
Javelin under a joint venture approach.  [Ref. 20:p. J-i] 
2. Mission 
The mission of Javelin is to defeat both conventional and 
reactive armor. Javelin may also be used to defeat other 
targets that may be encountered on the modern battlefield. 
[Ref. 20:p. J-i] 
3. Technical Description 
The critical technologies of the Javelin weapon system 
can be grouped into the following categories command launch 
unit (CLU), tactical round, guidance and control and 
propulsion.  [Ref. 20:p. C-10] 
a.   CLU 
The CLU is the reusable component of the system. It 
consists of an integral visible day telescope and a long- 
wavelength infrared nightsight with wide and narrow fields of 
view, a round launching latch, a battery box/power connector, 
a test connector and a handgrip/control housing. A monocular 
eyepiece assembly allows the user to view the CLU nightsight 
video, missile seeker video, CLU day telescope and system 
status information. The CLU is used for battlefield 
surveillance, target acquisition, missile launch and damage 
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assessment.  Figure 4 is an illustration of the CLU Equipment 
Set.  [Ref. 20:p. C-14] 
b. Tactical Round 
The tactical round is the expendable item of the 
system. It consists of the missile and disposable launch tube 
assembly with replaceable battery cooling unit (BCU). The 
missile is comprised of four sections; guidance section, 
midbody section, propulsion section and control actuator 
section (CAS). The midbody/warhead section includes a full 
caliber shaped warhead, the electronic safe-arm fuse device 
and eight midbody wings. The CAS consists of two circuit card 
assemblies, the missile thermal battery and four direct 
current brushless motors with integral ball screws which are 
connected to the thrust vector control and control fins with 
crank-arm linkages. Figure 5 depicts the tactical round. 
[Ref. 20:pp. C-13-C-14] 
c. Guidance and Control 
The guidance section consists of a seeker head and 
a guidance electronics unit (GEU). The guidance and control 
section is located in the warhead. The seeker collects 
infrared (IR) energy from the target scene through an IR 
transparent dome. The energy is passed through a lens 
assembly to an element mercury-cadmium-telluride focal plane 
array (FPA) detector. The detector is mounted on a rate 
stabilized gimbal platform. A dewar/cryostat provides fast 
cool down of the seeker FPA and maintains the operating 
temperature. Cooling is provided by a replaceable battery 
cooling unit during target acquisition and lock-on. During 
missile flight, cooling is provided by an on-board gas bottle. 
The GEU is part of the guidance section and is located behind 
the seeker and in front of the midbody/warhead section. The 
GEU includes four single-sided surface mount technology 
circuit card assemblies, a power distribution assembly, the 
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Figure 5.  Tactical Round 
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The FPA is one of the most critical components of 
the guidance system. The FPA technology provides the eyes for 
both the infrared seeker and the CLU's thermal sight. This 
technology provides the Javelin with its fire-and-forget 
capability. The fire-and-forget system is basically a small 
computer, located in the front of the missile, that recognizes 
the infrared picture of the target and guides the missile to 
it. The heart of this system is the FPA, which is smaller 
than a fingernail. The FPA allows the system to see through 
varying degrees of darkness, haze, dust, fog and smoke. 
Advancements provided by the FPA include improvement in 
infrared performance, increased resolution, enhanced target 
definition, improved tracking and a smaller overall system. 
[Ref. 23:p. 3] 
d.       Propulsion 
The propulsion section is a dual-in-line assembly of 
the launch and flight motor. The propulsion section provides 
missile propulsion while the missile is in the launch tube as 
well as propulsion force to the missile during flight. The 
unit also functions as part of the missile airframe. [Ref. 
20:p. C-14] 
4.   Technical History 
The history of Javelin can be traced to the Infantry Man- 
portable Antiarmor/Assault Weapon System (IMAAWS)/Rattler 
Program and Tank Breaker Program. Both of these programs were 
based on the requirement to develop a missile system that was 
portable by one man, weigh under 35 pounds, have a reusable 
guidance unit, low backblast and firing signature and reduce 
the amount of time the gunner is exposed to enemy fire. The 
IMAAWS/Rattler Program studied the use of a focal plane array 
seeker that had been developed under an earlier DARPA study, 
Tank Breaker. The idea of a fire-and-forget missile was also 
examined under the IMAAWS/Rattler Program. Under the 
IMAAWS/Rattler Program six contractors submitted proposals 
based on the requirements listed above.  In January 1983, the 
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funding for the IMAAWS/Rattler was canceled and the program 
office was closed. However, these studies did prove that the 
potential for a weapon that could meet the requirements listed 
above existed.  [Ref. 21:p. 1] 
During the FY 85 budget process, Congress informed the 
Pentagon that greater cooperation and elimination of 
duplication in the area of antiarmor was expected from the 
Services. In response to the Congressional request DoD was 
required to submit a new Antiarmor Master Plan. One element 
of the Antiarmor Master Plan submitted called for the 
replacement of the current medium antiarmor weapon system, 
Dragon. The Antiarmor Weapon System - Medium (AAWS-M) 
Program, which was eventually renamed Javelin, was begun to 
meet the requirement to replace Dragon, thus the beginning of 
the Javelin Program.  [Ref. 21:pp. 1-2] 
5.   Acquisition Strategy 
Based on the studies conducted prior to program 
initiation, Javelin's acquisition strategy was to begin with 
a Proof of Principle (POP) Phase in which three alternative 
approaches would be studied. The POP Phase can be viewed as 
Phase I, Concept Demonstration and Validation. This POP Phase 
was to be 27 months long and the result would be a decision on 
which technical approach to pursue for the remainder of the 
program. The plan was for open competition during the POP 
Phase. The winner of the POP was to be required to select 
another contractor, capable of producing the system, as a team 
member. The idea behind the teaming approach was to establish 
two qualified sources for system production. [Ref. 20:p. C- 
10] One contractor team was to be chosen at the end of the 
POP for FSD and LRIP. The FSD was to last 36 months. The 
members of the contractor team for the FSD were to compete for 
the full-rate production of the system. Figure 6 depicts 
Javelin's POP schedule and Figure 7 is an illustration of 
Javelin's EMD schedule.  [Ref. 22] 









































Figure 6.  Proof of Principle Schedule 
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Figure 7.  Javelin EMD and Production Schedule 
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and planned to achieve the early FUE by the use of 
concurrency. FSD competition was to be limited to the 
contractors who successfully competed in the POP. Risk 
reduction measures outlined in the strategy included a plan to 
use NTE prices in LRIP and demonstrated success in POP. The 
plan also called for the use of dual sources for critical 
system components. The FSD contract was to be a cost-plus- 
incentive-fee (CPIF) with two LRIP options.   [Ref. 22] 
6.   Acquisition Strategy Execution 
The execution of Javelin's acquisition strategy was begun 
with the release of the POP RFP in May 1986. Three contracts 
were awarded for the POP to three contract teams. The teams 
consisted of Ford Aerospace/General Dynamics, Hughes 
Aircraft/Honeywell and Texas Instruments/Martin Marietta. 
[Ref. 21:p. 1] The Army evaluated three technology concepts 
during the POP Phase. The three concepts tested were the 
carbon dioxide (C02) laser beam rider (LBR), the imaging 
infrared (IIR) fiber optic guidance and the IIR fire-and- 
forget. The IIR fire-and-forget guidance technology was 
selected for the transition to FSD. The recommended approach 
was approved at a DAB review in June 1989. Approval was also 
given for Javelin to proceed into the next acquisition phase, 
FSD.  [Ref. 20:pp. C-l-C-2] 
The next step in the Javelin Program was the start of 
FSD. The Joint Venture team of Texas Instruments/Martin 
Marietta was selected to carry its version of the Javelin 
through FSD. The CPIF FSD contract was awarded June 1989. 
The Javelin Program experienced several problems during the 
planned 36-month FSD. The problems included extensive cost 
growth and technical problems with weight and the focal plane 
array development. The cost growth that occurred during FSD 
was over 2.5 times greater than the original contractor cost 
estimate. The technical problems also lead to an inability to 
meet the planned schedule of 36 months for FSD. Based on the 
problems encountered by Javelin during FSD, the program 
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manager recommended that the program be restructured by 
increasing the FSD from 36 months to 54 months. The Defense 
Acquisition Executive (DAE) approved the proposed program 
restructuring in September 1991.  [Ref. 20:p. C-2] 
The impacts of the restructured program were a delay in 
IOTE by 20 months to October 1993 and FUE by 26 months to 
April 1996. The DT and IOTE were successfully completed by 
October 1993. Another impact of the restructuring was that 
the LRIP options placed in the FSD contract were canceled. 
The LRIP options were cancelled because of OSD's position that 
the original LRIP option's pricing placed too much risk on the 
contractor. [Ref. 20:p. J-6] The DAB proceedings for the 
LRIP decision were held in May 1994. The LRIP was approved 
and awarded to Texas Instruments/Mart in Marietta.  [Ref. 20 :p. 
C-2] 
Based on the restructuring of the program, the 
acquisition strategy for the remainder of the program has been 
changed. The new strategy maintains a sole source to Texas 
Instruments/Martin Marietta Joint Venture through two LRIPs 
and the first two FRP buys. This strategy was adopted in 
order to achieve cost savings based on lower overhead rates of 
maintaining the same contractor. Three bids will be requested 
for all production buys occurring after the completion of the 
first two buys. [Ref. 20:p. C-10] The program is currently 
in the first of the two planned LRIPs and the Milestone III 
decision to enter into FRP is scheduled for the second quarter 
of 1996. 
D.  SUMMARY 
This chapter presented brief system overviews of ATACMS 
and Javelin. The brief technical history of each program was 
presented to provide information on which each of the system's 
acquisition strategies were formulated. This chapter also 
outlined the acquisition strategy developed for each program 
and how each program progressed through the acquisition 
process. 
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IV.  COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter compares and analyzes the acquisition 
strategies used by ATACMS and Javelin. This chapter outlines 
the similarities and differences in the two programs. This 
chapter also examines the strengths and weaknesses of each 
program's acquisition strategy. This chapter concludes with 
a comparison of both programs' acquisition strategies to the 
five evaluation criteria discussed in Chapter II and a summary 
of the principal lessons learned from the study. 
B. SIMILARITIES 
The ATACMS and Javelin Programs have many similarities. 
Both are ACAT ID major weapon system acquisitions that fall 
under the same PEO, Tactical Missiles located in Huntsville, 
Alabama. Both systems were developmental surface missiles and 
were based on studies previously conducted by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency. Based on the results of 
the studies conducted, both programs skipped at least one 
phase of the acquisition process. ATACMS began in Phase II, 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD), and Javelin 
began in Phase I, Demonstration and Validation. Support from 
the Army for both programs was strong. Both programs held 
competitions to determine which contractor to use for the FSD 
prime. The FSD prime contractors selected for both programs 
were major defense companies with excellent business 
reputations in defense contracting. Lastly, both weapon 
systems have been successfully developed with ATACMS currently 
in FRP and Javelin currently in LRIP. 
C. DIFFERENCES 
In spite of the similarities listed above, these weapon 
system acquisition programs did have some differences. The 
key differences discussed are summarized in Table 2. 
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ATACMS Javelin 
Technology Used Mature State-Of-The-Art 
EMD Length 48 Months 3 6 Months 
EMD Contract Type FPIF CPIF 
Rebaselining Required No Yes 
Defense Enterprise Program Yes No 
Table 2.  Summary of Differences 
1.  Maturity of Technology 
The most significant difference was the maturity of the 
technologies selected for use by each program. The guidance 
and control, warhead and propulsion systems selected for use 
on ATACMS were within the state-of-the-art. The technologies 
for these ATACMS's systems had already been proven on past 
weapon systems and or other commercial products. On the other 
hand, one key component, the FPA which provides the fire-and- 
forget capability and is part of the CLU and the guidance 
system, chosen for use in the Javelin program was outside the 
state-of-the-art, meaning the technology was yet to be 
invented. Thus, the Javelin program was one of true 
invention. Therefore, there was an inherent level of high 
risk associated with the development of Javelin well above 
that of ATACMS. This inherent level of high risk is the major 
factor that should have driven the development of Javelin's 
acquisition strategy as the maturity of the technology affects 
many aspects of the acquisition strategy such as: how the 
program should be tailored, schedule length and contract 
types. This statement is supported by the development of both 
systems' acquisition strategies. Based on the technology 
selected, the decision process used to develop ATACMS's 
acquisition strategy was successful, while the decision 
process used for the Javelin Program failed to successfully 
analyze the impacts of the maturity of the technology and a 
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strategy was developed with an EMD schedule that proved to be 
unattainable. 
2.   Length of EMD 
ATACMS's acquisition strategy called for a 48-month EMD, 
while Javelin's acquisition strategy had a 36-month EMD 
planned. ATACMS allowed adequate time for the contractor to 
complete EMD as evidenced by the program's successful 
completion of EMD on schedule. Javelin's acquisition strategy 
did not allow the contractor enough time to complete EMD. 
Therefore, the program had to be restructured from a 36-month 
EMD to a 54-month EMD. The major reason the Javelin Program 
was unable to meet the scheduled 3 6-month EMD was the 
occurrence of technical problems. 
The technical problems experienced in the development of 
Javelin were mainly from two areas. First, the development of 
the FPA was much more difficult than anticipated and even once 
developed the manufacturing process for the FPA proved to also 
be a problem. Texas Instruments, the EMD prime contractor, 
was never able to develop or economically manufacture the FPA 
for the missile guidance system. An alternate supplier, Santa 
Barbara Research center, had to be found for the development 
and production. Second, the weight requirement of 45 pounds 
for total system weight, later rebaselined to 49.5 pounds, 
proved to be a tremendous management problem for the program 
office. The weight problem centered on engineering; how to 
put so many new capabilities into a small package. In order 
to meet the weight requirement, the majority of the components 
of the system had to be redesigned with weight reduction as a 
goal. System weight became such an issue in the Javelin 
Program that individual component weights were measured and 
tracked in grams. The weight requirement became one of the 
major cost drivers in the program and contributed greatly to 
the program's cost overrun problem. The technical problems 
also resulted in schedule delays for the Javelin Program. The 
maturity and complexity of the technology selected for use on 
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a program should be one of the key considerations as to the 
amount of time allowed for the development process. 
3.  Contract Types 
The programs used different contract types for EMD. 
ATACMS used an FPIF contract for EMD and Javelin used a CPIF 
contract. The technology used for ATACMS had already been 
proven on previous weapons and or commercial use. Therefore, 
ATACMS was able to use a fixed-price type contract for EMD. 
The fixed-price contract worked well for ATACMS as EMD was 
completed on cost and schedule. Javelin's technology was 
outside the state-of-the-art. Based on this fact, a cost 
contract was used for Javelin's EMD. Javelin experienced a 
tremendous cost management problem during EMD. EMD cost grew 
over two and a half times that of the contractor's original 
estimate. Cost contracts by their nature may incentivize a 
contractor to buy-in on the contact, meaning that the 
contractor under bids intentionally in order to win the 
contract. Buying-in can cause many problems for the program 
office with the most likely of these being a cost overrun. 
There is evidence that Javelin's contractor bought-in on the 
contract, based on two facts. First, the contractor's 
estimate was much lower than the Government's estimate and 
second, the tremendous overrun that occurred in the execution 
of the EMD contract. The inclusion of methods to prevent 
buying-in such as the use of cost realism as an evaluation 
criterion during the source selection process may have also 
helped to prevent the cost overrun. 
The fixed-price contract incentivised the contractor for 
ATACMS to be more cost conscious than did the cost contract 
used for Javelin because the ATACMS's contractor knew that any 
cost overrun would come out of his pocket. The fixed-price 
contract placed the majority of the risk on the contractor, 
while the cost type contract used by Javelin placed the 
majority of the risk on the Government. The fixed-price 
contract also required less administration, provided the 
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contractor with more freedom and did not require the use of 
cost/schedule control systems criteria. 
Another factor that may have contributed to ATACMS 
success is the fact that the prime contractor knew that he 
would also be awarded the production contract. Therefore, the 
ATACMS's prime contractor knew the successful completion of 
EMD was a guarantee for future business. Javelin's strategy 
called for a competition between the two members of the Joint 
Venture Team, preforming the EMD contract, to determine who 
would win the production contract. This type of strategy may 
have caused unseen animosity between the two members of the 
Joint Venture Team, which could have contributed to Javelin's 
problems during EMD. 
4.   Defense Enterprise Designation 
ATACMS was designated as a Defense Enterprise Program, 
while Javelin was required to follow the procedures for a 
normal major developmental weapon system acquisition outlined 
in DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2. The Defense Enterprise 
Program Designation was intended to allow the ATACMS program 
more flexibility. The designation gave the ATACMS Program 
Office the authority to drop all requirements placed on the 
program except those required by statue. This allowed ATACMS 
more flexibility than Javelin enjoyed. However, this 
designation did not provide as much flexibility for ATACMS as 
was intended. Colonel Dave Matthews, a past ATACMS Program 
Manager, felt that the Defense Enterprise Designation was 
great in theory but in reality did not provide the intended 
amount of flexibility. He thought that the informal 
resentment of the bureaucrats circumvented because of the 
designation stifled the intent of the program. The program 
office felt pressure not to drop requirements and only used 
the authority provided by the designation on a limited basis. 
[Ref. 29] 
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D.   ACQUISITION STRATEGY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
1.   ATACMS 
a. Strengths 
Analysis of the acquisition strategy of ATACMS 
reveals the following strengths: 
• Effective use of tailoring 
• Realism 
• FPIF contract for EMD 
• Flexibility 
The strategy was tailored to fit the technology 
available. Based on the technology available, the acquisition 
process was able to be shortened significantly for ATACMS. 
ATACMS skipped two phases of the acquisition process beginning 
in Phase II, EMD. Time was not the only saving that can be 
attributed to the shortened acquisition process. The 
shortened process also saved millions of dollars based on the 
deletion of the acquisition phases. The strategy took a 
realistic approach, in that, the strategy allowed the 
contractor adequate time to successfully complete EMD and 
selected technology that was within the state-of-the-art. The 
technology selected also allowed the program office to use an 
FPIF contract for EMD which incentivized the contractor to 
complete the EMD contract on cost and schedule. Flexibility 
was achieved by the planning of two LRIP options and 
alternative production options into the strategy. 
b. Weaknesses 
Analysis of the acquisition strategy of ATACMS 
reveals the following weaknesses: 
• Dual sourcing for critical components 
• Use of ATACMS contract to do MLRS integration 
ATACMS lost critical time when Singer, maker of the 
46 
CAS, defaulted. If another source for the CAS had been 
available, the problem of recertifying another contractor on 
short notice could have been avoided. The mixing of the MLRS 
integration into ATACMS strategy created conflicts of interest 
between the MLRS Program Office and the ATACMS Program Office, 
because both program offices were essentially working on the 
same thing. Since MLRS already had an established program 
office with experience and expertise on the MLRS, a better 
strategy might have been to make the MLRS Program Office 
solely responsible for the integration. 
2.   Javelin 
a.   Strengths 
Examination of Javelin's acquisition strategy 
reveals the following strengths: 
• Use of Dual Sourcing 
• Flexibility 
• Full and open competition during POP 
Use of dual sourcing for critical components was 
Javelin's acquisition strategy's greatest strength. When 
problems arose with the development of the FPA it was the 
second source, Santa Barbara Research Center, who was the 
only one to successfully develop the FPA for the guidance 
system. If it were not for the second source, the program 
would have failed. The strategy proved to be flexible. This 
is indicated by the program office's ability to successfully 
overcome the problems encountered during EMD and to 
successfully complete EMD on the restructured schedule. Use 
of full and open competition during POP yielded a weapon 
system that could meet or exceed mission requirements. The 
fire-and-forget concept developed and selected in POP is 
state-of-the-art technology and will provide U.S. Forces with 
a distinct advantage once fielded. 
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b.       Weaknesses 
Analysis of Javelin's acquisition strategy reveals 
the following weaknesses: 
• Realism 
• Cost estimation and control methods 
Javelin's acquisition strategy was very aggressive 
considering Javelin was a program of true invention. 
Insufficient time was scheduled for the completion of EMD. 
This resulted in an inability to meet the initially 
established EMD of 3 6 months. The required restructuring 
brought serious doubt upon the program and required the 
program manager to rejustify the program's existence. Cost 
estimation and control methods alone were ineffective in 
controlling costs. The cost overrun experienced in the 
Javelin Program was so large it jeopardized the existence of 
the program. Based on the high cost risk of a program of true 
invention, methods to correctly estimate and control program 
costs should have been paramount in the acquisition strategy. 
E.   COMPARISON TO EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Chapter II outlined certain aspects of an acquisition 
strategy that have proven to be beneficial in ensuring that an 
acquisition strategy can meet the program objectives. These 
criteria are realism, stability, balance, flexibility, and 
controlled risk and are defined in Chapter II. The results of 
the comparison of the acquisition strategies of each weapon 
system to the evaluation criteria are summarized in Table 3. 
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Evaluation Criteria 1   ATACMS Javelin 
Realism Yes NO 
Stability Yes NO 
Balance Yes No 
Flexibility Yes Yes 
Controlled Risk Yes No 
Table 3.  Summary of Comparison 
The comparison indicates that the acquisition strategy 
criteria outlined in the Defense Systems Management College's 
"Acquisition Strategy Guide" are valid. ATACMS's acquisition 
strategy meets all of the established criteria and the ATACMS 
Program was very successful. ATACMS's success is indicated by 
the development of a quality weapon system on cost and 
schedule. Another indication of ATACM's success is the fact 
that the ATACMS Program Manager was named the Army's Program 
Manager of the Year in 1991. On the other hand, the Javelin 
Program's acquisition strategy does not meet the majority of 
the evaluation criteria and as discussed in this thesis the 
program encountered many problems as it was executed. 
1.   ATACMS 
a. Realism 
ATACMS's acquisition strategy's realism is evidenced 
in several areas of the program. The acquisition strategy 
allowed sufficient time for successful completion of EMD, 48 
months, and used technology that was mature reducing overall 
program risk. Efforts were also made by the program office to 
ensure requirements outlined in the ROC were not inflated past 
proven technology. 
b. Stability 
ATACMS's acquisition strategy's stability is 
indicated by the program's ability to continue with minimal 
problem when a subcontractor making a critical component 
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defaulted. The negative influence of the default did not 
disrupt the operation of the program. The program office used 
the second LRIP option to elevate the problem. The strategy 
also called for the use of a multi-year contract for the 
production buy. The use of a multi-year contract is a long- 
term commitment to the contractor and thus adds stability to 
the program. 
c. Balance 
ATACMS's acquisition strategy proved to be balanced 
as indicated by the program's overall performance. ATACMS 
maintained the cost, schedule and performance objectives 
established at the onset of the program without fail. 
d. Flexibility 
ATACMS's acquisition strategy proved to be flexible. 
Just as the program office was preparing to field the first 
unit with ATACMS, DoD directed a change to the fielding plan 
in support of the Gulf War. The program office was able to 
successfully adapt to the changed fielding plan and to date 
all fieldings have been made on schedule. The strategy also 
included alternative production options. The alternative 
production options were developed in the event Congress failed 
to approve the preferred production option of a multi-year 
contract. 
e. Controlled Risk 
ATACMS's acquisition strategy successfully 
controlled the risk associated with the acquisition of the 
weapon system. This is illustrated by the program being 
completed on cost and schedule to date. Some methods used to 
mitigate risk were: the use of fixed-price type contracts that 
incentivized the contractor to maintain cost and schedule 
objectives, the use of hard-tooled prototypes that required 
the contractor to establish and maintain the production line 
early in the process and the use of early troop involvement in 
the developmental testing that reduced the number of changes 
required during the development process. 
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2.   Javelin 
a. Realism 
Javelin's acquisition strategy had some elements 
that lacked realism. The acquisition strategy used took an 
aggressive approach in the establishment of a 36-month EMD. 
The 36-month EMD proved to be unattainable and the program had 
to be rebaselined. Another area where the program lacked 
realism was the establishment of the weight requirement. Due 
to technical difficulties, the contractor was unable to meet 
the initially established weight requirement so the initial 
requirement had to be rebaselined to an achievable total 
system weight. 
b. Stability 
The Javelin program experienced problems with 
stability due to the current DoD downsizing. The effect of 
the downsizing is a 40% reduction in the number of Javelin 
weapon systems required to meet the Army's needs. This 
reduction in the production requirement will probably cause an 
increase in the per unit price of the weapon system and 
increase schedule risk of the program. 
c. Balance 
The program experienced problems with balance as the 
technical problems were occurring. The program office was so 
focused on the technical problems occurring during EMD that 
the eventual cost problem went unforeseen until it was out of 
control. The estimated cost to complete EMD more than doubled 
as the program progressed. 
d. Flexibility 
The strategy proved to be flexible, in that, the 
program was able to continue in spite of the problems 
encountered. The program had both technical and cost 
problems, which caused the program to be restructured. The 
program office was able to successfully overcome the problems 
and EMD was successfully completed on the restructured 
schedule. 
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e.       Controlled Risk 
The program was unable to successfully control the 
risk associated with the program. This is indicated by the 
program's inability to successfully control the schedule and 
cost risk of the program. The program had a schedule slippage 
and cost overrun. 
F.   SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED 
This section summarizes the principal lessons learned 
based on the review of acquisition policies and from the study 
of ATACMS and Javelin acquisition programs. 
1. Maturity of Technology 
The maturity level of the technology selected for use on 
the program should be a key consideration in the development 
of the acquisition strategy. The maturity of the technology 
affects many aspects of the acquisition strategy such as: how 
the program should be tailored, schedule length and contract 
types. One significant difference in ATACMS and Javelin 
Programs was the maturity of the technology chosen for use. 
ATACMS's strategy planned a longer EMD than did Javelin's 
strategy even though Javelin's technology was less mature. 
The result of Javelin's aggressive approach was failure to 
meet the planned schedule. 
2. Realism 
The acquisition strategy developed must be realistic. 
This seems to be an obvious point but this study and many 
others have shown that is not always the case. Program 
managers are faced with conflicting demands when developing an 
acquisition strategy, in that, they are suppose to develop and 
field the product as soon as possible, while minimizing the 
technical and cost risks associated with the program. In 
making compromise between these conflicting elements the 
program manager must ensure that cost estimates are valid and 
the planned schedule remains attainable. ATACMS did well in 
this area using mature technology, ensuring program baselines 
remained attainable and planning an achievable schedule. Some 
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areas of Javelin's strategy were unrealistic. The aggressive 
schedule undertaken by Javelin proved to be unachievable due 
to the occurrence of technical problems and an unattainable 
weight requirement. 
3. Tailoring 
Tailoring is an important element of an acquisition 
strategy. Both the ATACMS and Javelin programs successfully 
tailored their acquisition strategies. Examples of tailoring 
done by each program was the shortening of the acquisition 
process based on the previous studies that were conducted. In 
both programs the acquisition strategies were successfully 
tailored to fit the specific elements of each program. 
4. Dual Sourcing 
Dual sourcing is an effective method of risk reduction. 
However, before dual sourcing is planned, a cost/benefit 
analysis of the use of dual sourcing should be completed to 
ensure that the dual sourcing will be cost effective. Both 
ATACMS and Javelin were affected by dual sourcing. ATACMS 
encountered problems due to a lack of dual sourcing, when the 
sole maker of a critical component went out of business. 
Javelin was saved by the use of dual sourcing, when the second 
source for a critical component was the only one able to 
successfully develop the component. 
5. Flexibility 
Flexibility is an important quality of an acquisition 
strategy. Both ATACMS and Javelin's acquisition strategies 
planned flexibility into their strategy through the use of two 
LRIPs. The second LRIP was to be used if problems arose in 
testing or other areas. The second LRIP is important because 
it can be used to prevent a break in production. If a break 
in production occurs, the production line must be recertified 
and the contractor must deal with the problem of idle workers. 
The second LRIP planned in the ATACMS's acquisition strategy 
was used to prevent a schedule breach when Singer defaulted on 
the CAS.  ATACMS entered the second LRIP to gain enough time 
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for another subcontractor to be recertified and prevented the 
schedule breach. 
54 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
A.   CONCLUSIONS 
Although the acquisition strategy of a developmental 
weapon system acquisition program is very important to program 
success, it would be naive to think that a well-developed 
acquisition strategy by itself will lead to success. Many 
other factors are also required in order for a program to be 
successful. Examples of other important factors required for 
success include strong leadership, support from the Service 
and Congress and allocation of adequate resources. The 
combination of all of the factors listed above lead to the 
successful execution of the acquisition of a weapon system. 
Realism is an important element in the development of an 
acquisition strategy. The Javelin Program's acquisition 
strategy is an example of how a lack of realism will only lead 
to future problems. Both cost and schedule estimates need to 
be realistic so that decision makers can make the correct 
decisions from the onset. The current goals of getting weapon 
systems to the field as fast and cheap as possible contribute 
to the problem of achieving realism. The idea of fast and 
cheap incentivizes the use of overly optimistic estimates, 
which lead to the development of unrealistic strategies. 
Somehow the incentive needs to be changed so that realism is 
incentivized more than over-optimism. 
Methods of limiting technology risks for 
developmental weapon system acquisitions need to be explored. 
The maturity level of technology selected for use in the 
developmental weapon system acquisition process has many 
impacts on the program. These impacts are seen in the 
Javelin Program. Examples are schedule and cost overruns. 
There is an inherent level of high risk associated with the 
use of immature technology in the acquisition of a weapon 
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system.  Some method to mitigate some of the risk before the 
start of the program would be beneficial. 
B.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the similarities and differences in the 
acquisition strategies used for ATACMS and Javelin and what 
can Program Managers learn from the success or failures of the 
execution of these programs' acquisition strategies? 
As pointed out in Chapter IV, Section B, ATACMS and 
Javelin have many similarities. However, the differences 
provided in Chapter IV, Section C indicate that there are some 
significant differences in the two programs' acquisition 
strategies. The most significant of these differences are the 
level of maturity of the technology selected for use, the 
length of EMD and the contract type selected for EMD. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. What were the acquisition strategies used by 
each of the programs and were the strategies selected 
appropriate for these programs? 
The acquisition strategies used by each of the 
programs are outlined in Chapter III, Sections B and C. The 
strategy selected for ATACMS was appropriate. This is 
indicated by the quality of the weapon system developed and 
the overall success of the program. Javelin's acquisition 
strategy was not appropriate based on the fact that the length 
of EMD planned did not match the maturity level of technology 
to be developed for the program. Javelin's EMD was 
restructured by adding additional time and was successfully 
completed on the restructured schedule. 
b. To what extent did the programs follow the 
acquisition strategies established at the start of the 
programs? 
ATACMS followed the strategy developed at the onset 
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except for the DoD directed fielding change in support of the 
Gulf War. Javelin was unable to follow the strategy developed 
at the onset of the program. Javelin was required to change 
the strategy based on the technical problems encountered in 
EMD. The changes included the addition of 18 months to EMD 
and a change to the planned production buy of the weapon 
system. The production buy was changed from competitive to 
sole source to the EMD contractor. 
c. What were the strengths and weaknesses of each 
of the two acquisition strategies? 
The strengths and weaknesses of each program's 
acquisition strategy are outlined in Chapter IV. ATACMS's 
acquisition strategy's most significant strength was the 
effective use of tailoring and its most detrimental weakness 
was the lack of dual sourcing for critical components. 
Javelin's acquisition strategy's most significant strength was 
the use of dual sourcing for critical components and its most 
detrimental weakness was the aggressive schedule planned for 
EMD. 
d. What impact does the acquisition strategy of a 
program have on the program's success or failure? 
The acquisition strategy of a developmental weapon 
system acquisition can have significant impact on the success 
or failure of the program as indicated by this study. 
However, a well developed acquisition strategy by itself will 
not always lead to success. Other factors also affect the 
success or failure of a program such as the quality of 
leadership, support provided and resources provided. 
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